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THE INFLUENCE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN ON THE SUPREME COURT’S
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY AND
EQUALITY
Wilson R. Huhn*
The spirit of Lincoln still lives.1
In recent years leading historians and legal scholars including Gary Wills, Charles Black,
Daniel Farber, Herman Belz, and George Fletcher have written about the profound effect that
Abraham Lincoln had both on this Nation’s conception of itself and the Constitution.2 I
*

B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law,
University of Akron School of Law.
1
Atlanta high school student, 1944. See note __ infra and accompanying text.
2
See GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992) (analyzing the
Gettysburg Address and other Lincoln writings from a literary, political, and philosophical perspective); CHARLES
BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM (1997); id. at 1 (stating, “This work is being undertaken to set upon a firmer and
wider ground the legitimacy of the human-rights law of the United States); id. at 5 (arguing that this nation’s
commitment to human rights is derived from the opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence, the Ninth
Amendment, and the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment ); HERMAN
BELZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1998) (describing the
changes to our Constitution arising out of the Civil War era); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION
(2001); id. at 2 (stating, “The Civil War called forth a new constitutional order.); id. at 2-3 (identifying three ways in
which the meaning of the Constitution changed after the Civil War – moving from an emphasis on choice to selfrealization, from freedom towards equality, and from elitism towards popular democracy); DANIEL FARBER,
LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003) (examining the constitutionality of Lincoln’s official actions during the Civil War,
and their effect on individual rights). See also Michael Stokes Paulson, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 691, 693 (2004) (reviewing Farber’s book and stating, “Given the centrality of
Lincoln and the Civil War to the constitutional order we have today, it is little short of incredible how little attention
modern scholarship pays to the Civil War as an event of constitutional interpretation or to Lincoln as a constitutional
interpreter.”). But see Jason A. Adkins, Lincoln’s Constitution Revisited, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 211 (2009) (criticizing
Farber for reading his own view of the Constitution into Lincoln’s life and work).
The American government’s conduct in fighting terrorism over the past decade has also revived interest in
Lincoln’s actions to suppress rebellion during the Civil War. See Michael Stokes Paulson, The Constitution of
Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257 (2004) (seeking to justify the Bush administration’s actions in the War on
Terror by reference to Lincoln’s actions in the Civil War); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, The Constitution of
Necessity, and the Necessity of Constitutions, 59 Me. L. Rev. 1 (2007), (responding to Professor Paulson); id at 3
(stating, “This essay is an effort to explain why we should reject the clever and alluring argument that Lincoln's
example justifies largely unchecked executive power in times of crisis.”). See also Michael Les Benedict, “The
Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions”: Lincoln, The Powers of the Commander-in-Chief, and the Constitution,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 927 (2008); id. at 928-929 (citing authorities characterizing Lincoln as a “dictator”). Benedict
states:
But those who stress Lincoln's willingness to disregard constitutional limitations in the Civil War
crisis have it wrong. Lincoln did exercise the war powers of the presidency aggressively, but he
never claimed the right to transcend constitutional limitations or to escape democratic control.
Indeed, he was constrained by the very popular commitment to the rule of law that he had
identified as the only security against presidential despotism.

1
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wholeheartedly concur with those authors as to the importance of Lincoln’s influence, and in this
article I seek to demonstrate how Lincoln’s ideas are reflected in the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court interpreting the principles of liberty and equality during the modern era.3
I have argued that Abraham Lincoln should be regarded as a framer of the Constitution
because of his central role in defining and resolving the transcendent constitutional issues of his
day.4 His importance extends far beyond his eloquence on the subject of human rights.5 He
commanded the armed forces of the United States in the war to preserve the Union,6 he issued
the Emancipation Proclamation freeing the slaves in the states in rebellion, and he was the person
principally responsible for the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.7 After his death the
Republican Party which he had led into power8 on a platform of human rights9 speedily adopted
Id. at 930. See also Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Constitution and Civil Liberties Under Lincoln, in OUR LINCOLN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON LINCOLN AND HIS WORLD 37-61 (Eric Foner, ed. 2008) (contending that Lincoln returned areas of
the United States to civil rule as quickly as possible). See also BELZ, supra, at 17-43 (refuting the notion that
Lincoln was a dictator); id. at 43 (stating, “Lincoln was neither a revolutionary nor a dictator, but a constitutionalist
who used the executive power to preserve and extend the liberty of the American founding.”).
3
By “modern era,” I mean since 1937, when the Supreme Court began protecting human rights instead of property
rights. See generally Wilson Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, 2 FLORIDA A. & M. UNIVERSITY LAW
REVIEW 1-90 (2007) (describing how the Supreme Court changed constitutional doctrine in a number of areas, and
defending the decisions of the Roosevelt Court against the attacks of Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence
Thomas).
4
See Wilson R. Huhn, Lincoln Was a Framer of the Constitution, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. (2009 Comments)
(describing how Lincoln articulated and shaped the fundamental constitutional issues of pre-Civil War and Civil
War period), available at http://lawreview.wustl.edu/comments/abraham-lincoln-was-a-framer-of-the-constitution/.
5
I do not mean to minimize Lincoln’s importance in that regard. See GABOR BORITT, THE GETTYSBURG GOSPEL:
THE LINCOLN SPEECH THAT NOBODY KNOWS 202 (2006) (describing how Lincoln was revered by Tolstoy, Gandhi,
Nehru, and Sun Yat-Sen).
6
See James M. McPherson, A. Lincoln: Commander in Chief, in OUR LINCOLN, note 2 supra, at 19-36 (describing
Lincoln’s generalship in the Civil War); id. at 36(stating, “He enunciated a clear national policy, and through trial
and error evolved national and military strategies to achieve it.).
7
Even William Lloyd Garrison, who had frequently criticized Lincoln for not supporting the abolition of slavery
more fervently, credited Lincoln for the adoption of the 13th Amendment. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF
RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 690 (2005) (quoting Garrison):
And to whom is the country more immediately indebted for this vital and saving amendment of
the Constitution than, perhaps, to any other man? … I believe I may confidently answer – to the
humble railsplitter of Illinois – to the Presidential chainbreaker for millions of the oppressed – to
Abraham Lincoln!
8
See generally DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 162-256 (1995) (describing Lincoln’s political life between
1854 and his election to the Presidency in 1860); JULIE M. FENSTER, THE CASE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A STORY OF
ADULTERY, MURDER, AND THE MAKING OF A GREAT PRESIDENT (2007) (describing Lincoln’s speeches and political
efforts on behalf of the Republican Party in 1856); id. at 118-121 (describing the “Lost Speech” at Bloomington,
Illinois, on May 29, 1856, organizing the Republican Party in Illinois).
9
See John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29619 (1856 Republican Party platform, referring to the
“principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence, and embodied in the Federal Constitution”); id. at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29620 (1860 Republican Party platform, same, and quoting the
second sentence of the Declaration); id. at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29621 (1864
Republican Party platform, favoring the adoption of a constitutional amendment “as shall terminate and forever
prohibit the existence of Slavery within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States.”).

2
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the Fourteenth Amendment which introduced the principles of the Declaration of Independence
into the Constitution.10 He was indisputably the principal figure behind the “Second American
Revolution”11 that made the concept “all men are created equal” part of our fundamental law.12
Lincoln’s influence on constitutional analysis may be traced and followed in Supreme
Court history, but the sad fact is that for nearly a century the Supreme Court denied Lincoln’s
legacy and betrayed the intent of the framers of the post-civil war amendments. Immediately
following the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments the Supreme
Court eviscerated key provisions of those amendments and throughout the nineteenth century the
Court emasculated the power of Congress to enact civil rights laws meant to enforce the
Amendments.13 Lincoln planted the seed and tilled the field for “a new birth of freedom” in the

10

See U.S. CONST., amend. 14. This purpose was implicit in Lincoln’s statement in the Peoria Address:
Our republican robe is soiled, and trailed in the dust. Let us repurify it. Let us turn and wash it
white, in the spirit, if not the blood, of the Revolution. Let us turn slavery from its claims of
``moral right,'' back upon its existing legal rights, and its arguments of ``necessity.'' Let us return it
to the position our fathers gave it; and there let it rest in peace. Let us re-adopt the Declaration of
Independence, and with it, the practices, and policy, which harmonize with it. Let north and south--let all Americans---let all lovers of liberty everywhere---join in the great and good work. If we
do this, we shall not only have saved the Union; but we shall have so saved it, as to make, and to
keep it, forever worthy of the saving. We shall have so saved it, that the succeeding millions of
free happy people, the world over, shall rise up, and call us blessed, to the latest generations.
2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 276 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1953) (hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS),
available online from a website maintained by the Abraham Lincoln Association, at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/. See also Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court:
Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments & the State Action Syllogism, A Brief
Historical Overview, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1381 (2009); id. at 1383 (stating, “the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments were a second founding. In the second founding, a second group of framers sought to give
the nation a new birth of freedom and to bring it closer to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution's preamble.”); Robert Kaczorowski, Congress’ Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Lessons from the Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. LEG. 187, 199, 203 (2005) (contending that
framers of the 14th Amendment such as Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax and Senator Lyman Trumbull
expressly intended to incorporate the principles of the Declaration into the Constitution).
11
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991); see also Michael
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s Book, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1113, 1172 (1993) (stating, “If the
Civil War was the second American Revolution, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments gave birth to a
transformed Constitution and Bill of Rights.”); FLETCHER, note __ supra, at 2 (referring to the Civil War
Amendments as having created a “second American Constitution”).
12
But see MICHAEL LIND, WHAT LINCOLN BELIEVED: THE VALUES AND CONVICTIONS OF AMERICA’S GREATEST
PRESIDENT 16 (2004) (stating, “The images of Lincoln as the Savior of the Union, the Great Commoner, and the
Great Emancipator are not lies; they are myths.”).
13
See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 70-71 (1966) (stating, “the cumulative
weakening of resistance to racism was expressed also in a succession of decisions by the United States Supreme
Court between 1873 and 1898 ….”); ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 194 (2006) (“as support for reconstruction waned in the North, the [Supreme] court began to
emasculate the legislative and constitutional amendments of the 1860s”); Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of
Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051 (2009)
(critiquing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the post-civil war period narrowly construing the 14th Amendment
and striking down or rendering ineffective the Civil Rights Acts adopted during Reconstruction); cases cited at note
__ infra.

3
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United States, but only in the last few decades is Lincoln’s political philosophy blossoming and
bearing fruit in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
Since 1937, when Franklin Roosevelt nominated the first of eight justices he would
eventually appoint,14 the Supreme Court has come to interpret the Constitution in light of
Lincoln’s political philosophy. In particular, the Supreme Court has adopted a transcendent
understanding of the principles of liberty and equality. Part I of this article describes how
Lincoln articulates each of these principles, and Part II demonstrates how each principle has been
applied by the Supreme Court in modern times.
I.

LINCOLN’S TRANSCENDENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

Lincoln was the leading man of his age, and he both reflected and enhanced the dominant
philosophical movement of his time – transcendentalism. Gary Wills devotes an entire chapter
in his masterful book Lincoln at Gettysburg to the impact of the transcendental movement on
American society in general and on Lincoln in particular.15 Transcendentalism mixed Kantian
moral philosophy with Universalist religious belief, and the result was a kind of “natural law”
understanding of moral and religious imperatives.16 The many strands of Transcendentalism
reflect myriad concerns and viewpoints,17 but at its core all transcendentalists centered their faith
on the following principles:
1. Fundamental moral truths are accessible to the individual conscience through
reflection and intuition;18

14

See Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, note __ supra (describing the members, rulings, and significance of
the Roosevelt Court).
15
See WILLS, note __ supra, at 90-120 (chapter entitled “The Transcendental Declaration,” linking Lincoln’s
understanding of the Declaration to Transcendentalism).
16
See PHILIP F. GURA, AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM (2007) (describing the history of Transcendentalism in
America); id. at 46-68 (chapter entitled “Reinvigorating a Faith” describing the influence of Kantian thought on
certain members of the Unitarian Church); PERRY MILLER, THE TRANSCENDENTALISTS 3-15 (describing the
Transcendental movement); id. at 8 (stating, “the Transcendental movement is most accurately to be defined as a
religious demonstration. The real drive in the souls of the participants was a hunger of the spirit for values which
Unitarianism had concluded were no longer estimable.”); id. at 12 (calling Transcendentalism a “rift between
generations” of the Unitarian Church).
17
See GURA, note __ supra, at 5 (referring to the disparity of views within the Transcendental Club); id at 71
(describing how leading Transcendentalists met nearly 30 times between 1836 and 1840, when their meetings came
to an end because “the proliferation of so many different views of what constituted reform” prevented their meeting
on “’common ground,’” quoting historian Peter Carafoil).
18
See id. at 8 (describing Transcendentalism as “a way of perceiving the world, centered on individual
consciousness rather than external fact.”); id. at 11 (stating that “Innately present in each individual … is a spiritual
principle … that allows one to distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad, God and Satan, and it supersedes
any outward laws or injunctions.”); id. at 54 (discussing J.D. Morrell’s belief that “’there is an inward sense – a
rational intuition – a spiritual faculty – by which we have a direct and immediate revelation of supersensual things’
such as God, providence, freedom, and immortality.”); id. at 61 (discussing Sampson Reed’s influential pamphlet
Observations on the Growth of the Mind, in which Reed describes the mind as a “‘delicate germ, whose husk is the
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2. These truths are eternal and unchanging;19
3. These truths are universal to all mankind;20 and,
4. Every person has a moral obligation to recognize and act consistently with these
principles.21
In the 1850s the Transcendentalist Movement was swallowed up by the antislavery
movement – leading transcendentalists such as Theodore Parker, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and
Henry David Thorough became consumed with the task of applying the timeless and universal
moral imperatives they believed in to the specific task of abolishing American slavery.22
Similarly, as a result of his opposition to slavery Abraham Lincoln sought to bring our society
and our law more in line with fundamental moral truths. He found both inspiration and a ready
tool in the Declaration of Independence.
The Declaration of Independence as a Higher Law
The second sentence of the Declaration of Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed ….23
In 1861 at Independence Hall in Philadelphia Lincoln said, “I have never had a feeling
politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence.”
He added:
body,’ put into the world so that ‘the light and heat of heaven may fall upon it with a gentle radiance, and call forth
its energies.’”).
19
See id. at 14 (quoting O.B. Frothingham describing Transcendentalism as “a belief in ‘the living God in the Soul,
faith in immediate inspiration, in boundless possibility, and in an unimaginable good.’”). See, e.g., Theodore Parker,
A Discourse of the Transient and Permanent in Christianity (1841) in MILLER, note __ supra,at 259-283. This
famous sermon by one of the leading Transcendentalists considered Jesus’ teachings to be permanent, but religious
institutions and forms of worship to be merely transient. Parker stated:
Looking at the Word of Jesus, at real Christianity, the pure religion he taught, nothing appears
more fixed and certain. Its influence widens as light extends; it deepens as the nations grow more
wise. But, looking at the history of what men call Christianity, nothing seems more uncertain and
perishable.
Id. at 262.
20
See GURA, note __ supra, at 68 (describing the movement’s “profound sense of universal brotherhood”).
21
See id. at 225 (describing Henry David Thorough’s belief that “Man’s conscience constituted the higher law, and
only the state that recognized this was worthy of man’s allegiance.”).
22
See id. at 240-266 (Chapter 9, entitled “The Inward Turn,” describing how the transcendental movement merged
into the antislavery movement); id. at 241 (stating, “Transcendentalists … became preoccupied with issues they
believed were unique to the United States, chief among them the curse of slavery.”); MILLER, note __ supra, at 13
(referring to the “channelizing of reforming energies into the antislavery crusade”).
23
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
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I have often inquired of myself, what great principle or idea it was that
kept this Confederacy so long together. It was not the mere matter of the
separation of the colonies from the mother land; but something in that Declaration
giving liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all
future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights should be
lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance.
This is the sentiment embodied in that Declaration of Independence.24
The Declaration comprised Lincoln’s core political philosophy, and the principal
significance of his life and work was that he persuaded his countrymen that the purpose of
America was to cultivate and preserve these principles for the benefit of all mankind.25 Like
Daniel Webster,26 Lincoln believed that patriotism and loyalty to the Union had a purpose
24

4 COLLECTED WORKS 240.
See, e.g., Adkins, note __ supra, at 213 (“The unifying theme of his political career was the rededication of
America to its sacred charge.); but see LIND, note __ supra, at 13-18, (arguing that Gary Wills and other scholars
have misunderstood Lincoln as an egalitarian).
26
The speeches of Daniel Webster are available at Daniel Webster, Dartmouth’s Favorite Son, at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dwebster/. See, e.g., Webster’s speech at the Bunker Hill Monument, June 17, 1825,
where he said:
The last hopes of mankind, therefore, rest with us; and if it should be proclaimed, that our
example had become an argument against the experiment, the knell of popular liberty would be
sounded throughout the earth.
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dwebster/speeches/bunker-hill.html.
See also Daniel Webster, Funeral Oration for Adams and Jefferson, August 2, 1826:
We can never, indeed, pay the debt which is upon us; but by virtue, by morality, by
religion, by the cultivation of every good principle and every good habit, we may hope to enjoy
the blessing, through our day, and to leave it unimpaired to our children. Let us feel deeply how
much of what we are and of what we possess we owe to this liberty, and to these institutions of
government. Nature has, indeed, given us a soil which yields bounteously to the hand of industry,
the mighty and fruitful ocean is before us, and the skies over our heads shed health and vigor. But
what are lands, and seas, and skies, to civilized man, without society, without knowledge, without
morals, without religious culture; and how can these be enjoyed, in all their extent and all their
excellence, but under the protection of wise institutions and a free government?
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dwebster/speeches/adams-jefferson.html.
Our newest President has also recalled the sacrifices of the framers, and exhorted us to emulate their
commitment to freedom:
So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled.
In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying
campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing.
The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in
doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:
“Let it be told to the future world … that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope
and virtue could survive … that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came
forth to meet … it.”
America! In the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us
remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and
endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested
we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed
on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered
it safely to future generations.
25

6
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beyond simple group identity.27 America is not a race or a culture or even a land – it is instead a
set of fundamental truths about human nature, something worth fighting for and dying for.
Lincoln frequently expressed his conception of the Declaration as a form of higher law.
He considered the principles of the Declaration to be transcendental – transcending race,
nationality, time, and tradition – universal in their scope and applicable to the entire human
race.28 He conveyed this most often, and in light of the period and his audience, most
effectively, through the use of religious imagery.29 Examples of this are legion. In the Peoria
Address of 1854, his first great speech, twice he refers to the Declaration as an “ancient faith” –
first as “my ancient faith,” and then as “our ancient faith.”30 Also at Peoria, paraphrasing from
the Sermon on the Mount in the Book of Luke, Lincoln states:
It still will be the abundance of man's heart, that slavery extension is wrong; and
out of the abundance of his heart, his mouth will continue to speak.31
In a letter that he drafted but never sent, Lincoln used religious imagery to illustrate what
he considered to be the proper relation of the Declaration and the Constitution. The Book of
Proverbs states that “The word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver.”32 In this
unfinished letter Lincoln wrote that the principle of “liberty for all” made manifest in the
Declaration was “the word fitly spoken,” the “apple of gold” – and the Constitution merely the
“picture of silver” framed around it.33 By characterizing the Declaration as “the word,” Lincoln
See also President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President_Barack_Obamas_Inaugural_Address:
27
See MCPHERSON, at 115-116. McPherson states:
Lincoln’s nationalism was profound. It was not merely chauvinism, not the spread-eagle jingoism
typical of American oratory in the nineteenth century. It was rooted in the Declaration of
Independence and the ideals of liberty and equal opportunity that the Declaration had implanted as
a revolutionary new idea on which the United States was founded.
28
See WILLS, note __ supra, at 103 (stating, “The ideal is so general and time-free that it does not merely affect
Americans – rather, its influence radiates out to all people everywhere.”); Andrew Delbanco, Lincoln’s Sacramental
Language, in OUR LINCOLN, note __ supra, at 218 (stating, “His faith was in the transcendent principle of human
equality.”).
29
See JOHN CHANNING BRIGGS, LINCOLN’S SPEECHES RECONSIDERED (2005) (analyzing several of Lincoln’s
speeches from a literary standpoint, including Lincoln’s use of the King James Bible); Andrew Delbanco, note __
supra, 199-222 (describing Lincoln’s use of religious imagery).
30
2 COLLECTED WORKS 266.
31
2 COLLECTED WORKS 271. Lincoln’s audience would have immediately recognized the significance of Lincoln’s
biblical reference from Chapter 6 of the Book of Luke, in which Jesus chose his disciples and instructed them that
just as a tree is known by its fruit, the good or evil is in men’s hearts is also revealed. See Luke 6:45 (King James
Version) (“A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out
of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil: for of the abundance of the heart his mouth
speaketh.”).
32
Proverbs 25:11 (King James Version).
33
See COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168-169. Lincoln wrote:
The expression of that principle [“Liberty to all”], in our Declaration of Independence, was most
happy, and fortunate. Without this, as well as with it, we could have declared our independence of
Great Britain; but without it, we could not, I think, have secured our free government, and

7
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was suggesting a divine origin to the concepts of liberty and equality.34 To extend Lincoln’s
metaphor, the Declaration is the Bible, and the Constitution the church.35 The Declaration
expresses ideals that are eternal and that apply to all of humanity, while the Constitution is
merely our present understanding of those concepts, the earthly vessel meant to preserve those
ideals at a particular time and place.36 The Constitution serves and is subservient to the
Declaration.
At Gettysburg, Lincoln’s religious imagery becomes even more subtle and powerful.
“Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal.”37
In this first sentence alone, in the use of the words “four score,” Lincoln identifies the
Founders of our country with Abraham and Moses,38 and by use of the words “brought forth” he
compares them to God who “brought forth” the people of Israel from Egypt, and to Mary, the
mother of Jesus.39 Lincoln implicitly yet indelibly links the American people to the ancient
nation of Israel; the Declaration of Independence to the Ten Commandments; and the
announcement of the principles of liberty and equality to the birth of the Son of God.40
The Declaration Calls Us to Duty

consequent prosperity. No oppressed, people will fight, and endure, as our fathers did, without the
promise of something better, than a mere change of masters.
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word, “fitly spoken” which has
proved an “apple of gold” to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the picture of silver,
subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to
adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple – not the apple for the picture.
Id.
34

See John 1:1 (King James Version) (“In the beginning was the word ….”).
See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 44 (1988) (distinguishing between a “protestant” and
“catholic” approach to constitutional interpretation.); Elizabeth Reilly, Priest, Minister, or “Knowing Instrument”:
The Lawyer’s Role in Constructing Constitutional Meaning, 38 TULSA L. REV. 669 (2003) (discussing and
expanding upon Levinson’s theory regarding the difference between a “protestant” and “catholic” approach to
constitutional interpretation).
36
See WILLS, note __ supra, at 101 (“Lincoln distinguished between the Declaration as the statement of a
permanent ideal and the Constitution as an early and provisional embodiment of that ideal, to be tested against it,
kept in motion toward it.”
37
7 COLLECTED WORKS 23.
38
See Genesis 16:16 (King James Version) (“And Abram was fourscore and six years old, when Hagar
bare Ishmael to Abram.”); Exodus 7:7 (“And Moses was fourscore years old, and Aaron fourscore and
three years old, when they spake unto Pharaoh.”).
39
See id., 2 Chronicles 6:5 (King James Version) (“I brought forth my people out of the land of Egypt ….”);
Matthew 1:24-25 (“Then Joseph being raised from sleep did as the angel of the Lord had bidden him, and took unto
him his wife: And knew her not till she had brought forth her firstborn son: and he called his name JESUS.”).
40
See GABOR BORITT, THE GETTYSBURG GOSPEL: THE LINCOLN SPEECH THAT NOBODY KNOWS 120 (2006)
(stating, “Birth, sacrificial death, rebirth. A born-again nation. At a less than conscious level, Lincoln weaved
together the biblical story and the American story….”
35
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Yet another characteristic of Lincoln’s philosophy is that the Declaration imposes a duty
upon each and every one of us – it calls us to service. At Lewiston he admonishes us that it is we
who must “drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man’s success:”41
I charge you to drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man's success.
It is nothing; I am nothing; Judge Douglas is nothing. But do not destroy that
immortal emblem of Humanity---the Declaration of American Independence.42
At Independence Hall, Lincoln recalls the sacrifices of the founders:
I have often pondered over the dangers which were incurred by the men
who assembled here and adopted that Declaration of Independence – I have
pondered over the toils that were endured by the officers and soldiers of the army,
who achieved that Independence.43
Like Webster,44 Lincoln thought that the founders’ sacrifices obligate us to preserve and
uphold the principles of the Declaration.45 At Gettysburg, Lincoln turns our attention to the
sacrifices of the present generation – whose losses far exceed the amount of blood spilled and
fortune spent in the War of Independence.46 It was not enough for “we here,” to “dedicate” a
cemetery:
It is for us the living rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work
which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to
be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that from these honored
dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full
measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have
died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and

41

See 2 COLLECTED WORKS 547.
Id. (emphasis in original).
43
4 COLLECTED WORKS 240.
44
See note __ supra.
45
See 1 COLLECTED WORKS 115. In closing his speech to the Young Men’s Lyceum, Lincoln appeals to the
memory of the Founders in support of the “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions:”
They were the pillars of the temple of liberty; and now, that they have crumbled away, that temple
must fall, unless we, their descendants, supply their places with other pillars, hewn from the solid
quarry of sober reason. Passion has helped us; but can do so no more. It will in future be our
enemy. Reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the materials for our
future support and defence. Let those [materials] be moulded into general intelligence, [sound]
morality and, in particular, a reverence for the constitution and laws; and, that we improved to the
last; that we remained free to the last; that we revered his name to the last; [tha]t, during his long
sleep, we permitted no hostile foot to pass over or desecrate [his] resting place; shall be that which
to le[arn the last] trump shall awaken our WASH[INGTON.
See note __ supra and accompanying text (setting forth similar appeals by Daniel Webster and Barack
Obama).
46
See
42

9

Draft 6 Page 10 of 32
February 13, 2010
that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from
the earth.47
The Battle of Gettysburg is not solely something that happened in the distant past – it
continues to have significance for “we here” – that we here must complete the “unfinished
work,” the “great task remaining before us” – the preservation of liberty and equality.
Liberty and Equality Defined
At this point let us admit that we are limited in our ability to know exactly what Abraham
Lincoln means by “liberty” and “equality.” Lincoln does not articulate a single, precise legal
definition of either of those terms. In his letters and speeches he is not addressing a court in a
specific case. Instead, he is addressing his own generation as well as succeeding generations –
he is speaking to all Americans, present and future. As a result, he necessarily speaks in general
terms. Furthermore, the subject that dominated all others in his time, the great issue of the day,
was slavery. We cannot expect to learn Lincoln’s specific beliefs on topics germane to our own
time, such as a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy or the right of gay and lesbian couples to
marry. However, Lincoln’s definitions of liberty and equality, and, even more important, the
general approach that he takes to their interpretation, provide us with rich guidance.
Lincoln’s Definition of Liberty Is Close to That of John Stuart Mill
According to his friend Noah Brooks, Lincoln “particularly liked” John Stuart Mill’s On
Liberty.48 In that notable work Mill articulated the “harm principle,” the idea that the law may
restrict people only when they cause harm to others. Mill stated: “Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”49 Mill indicated that “The only part of the conduct
of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.”50 Finally, Mill noted that it is
only conduct affecting other people’s legal rights that may be subject to lawful restraint: “The
acts of an individual may be hurtful to others or wanting in due consideration for their welfare,
without going to the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be
justly punished by opinion, though not by law.”51 Many legal scholars believe that Mill has had
a profound influence on the development of constitutional law.52
47

7 COLLECTED WORKS 22-23.
See Noah Brooks, Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln, in THE LINCOLN ANTHOLOGY: GREAT WRITERS
ON HIS LIFE AND LEGACY FROM 1860 TO NOW 164, 179 (Harold Holzer, ed. 2009) (hereinafter HOLZER) (stating that
that Lincoln “particularly liked Butler’s Analogy of Religion, Stuart Mill On Liberty, and he always hoped to get at
President Edwards on the Will.”).
49
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (1859).
50
Id. at 9.
51
Id. at 73.
52
See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-03 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 21 (stating, “Contrary to how their decision was widely reported, the Lawrence majority did not protect a
‘‘right of privacy.’’ Instead, quite simply, they protected ‘‘liberty.’’); J. M. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in
48
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In 1864, at the Sanitary Fair in Baltimore, Lincoln applied Mill’s concept of liberty to the
problem of slavery. First, Lincoln acknowledged that Americans have different notions of what
“liberty” is:
We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean
the same thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he
pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others the same
word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the
product of other men's labor.53
Lincoln then contrasted these competing definitions by means of a simple yet
unforgettable metaphor:
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep
thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act
as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly the
sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty; and
precisely the same difference prevails to-day among us human creatures ….”54
Lincoln evidently meant for us to embrace the sheep’s definition of liberty: “for each man
to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor.”
In 1858 Lincoln offered another, similar phrasing of the liberty principle consistent with
Mill’s admonition that people are free to engage in actions that do not interfere with other
people’s “constituted rights.”55 Lincoln said: “I believe each individual is naturally entitled to
do as he pleases with himself and the fruit of his labor, so far as it in no wise interferes with any
other man's rights”56 Lincoln’s formulation anticipates and bears great similarity to John Rawls’

American Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 B. C. L. REV. 499, 575 (2004) (stating, “Justice Anthony
Kennedy's majority opinion [in Lawrence] articulates a notion of freedom that is reminiscent of John Stuart Mill.”);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 744-745 (2007) (discussing the influence of
John Stuart Mill on the development of the concept of freedom of speech); Wilson R. Huhn, Mill's Theory of Liberty
in Constitutional Interpretation, 22 AKRON L. REV. 133 (1988) (describing the influence of Mill’s libertarian
philosophy on constitutional analysis). But see Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships, 15 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285 (2006) (contending that while the decision in Lawrence is consistent with Mill’s
libertarian philosophy, Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence and Mill’s philosophy are both more extensive in the sense
that each contains elements that the other does not).
53
7 COLLECTED WORKS 301-302.
54
Id. at 302.
55
See note __ supra and accompanying text.
56
2 COLLECTED WORKS 493 (Speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858).
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“liberty principle,” which states that “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”57
As we shall see below, the Supreme Court has moved towards this libertarian viewpoint
in its interpretation of the Constitution.58
Universal Equality
A fundamental point is that Lincoln believed in the equality of all men, everywhere. In
reference to the phrase “all men are created equal” in the Declaration, Lincoln said, “I think the
authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men.”59 He predicted that this ideal
would, in the future, augment “the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors
everywhere.”60
On July 10, 1858, in the city of Chicago, Lincoln again made it clear that he did not
consider the notion of equality expressed in the Declaration to be a mere “social contract”
applicable to one race of men, but rather a universal principle. At a time when the No-Nothing
Party, a party whose support Lincoln needed for the Republican Party, was fiercely antiimmigrant,61 Lincoln reached out to immigrants, extending to them an equal share in the
American dream, stating that the principle of equality extends to all people “throughout the
world:”
We have besides these men – descended by blood from our ancestors –
among us perhaps half our people who are not descendants at all of these men,
they are men who have come from Europe – German, Irish, French and
Scandinavian – men that have come from Europe themselves, or whose ancestors
have come hither and settled here, finding themselves our equals in all things. If
they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by
blood, they find they have none, they cannot carry themselves back into that
glorious epoch and make themselves feel that they are part of us, but when they
look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those old men
say that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,”
and then they feel that that moral sentiment taught in that day evidences their
57

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1963). See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive
Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 69 (2009) (stating, “there is a fair case to be made that Rawls is very useful in
understanding the Equal Protection Clause,” and citing Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and
Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 394 (Samual Freedman ed., 2003); see also Frank
A. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term: Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14-16 (1969) (contending that the Equal Protection Clause should be construed to
be consistent with Rawls’ theory of justice).
58
See notes __-__ infra and accompanying text.
59
2 COLLECTED WORKS 405 (emphasis in original). See notes __-__ infra and accompanying text.
60
Id. at 406.
61
See GOODWIN, note __ supra, at __.
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relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that
they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of
the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration, and so they are. That is the
electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving
men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom
exists in the minds of men throughout the world.62
Consistent with Lincoln’s thoughts, it has become a basic tenet of constitutional law that
the Equal Protection Clause protects all persons, not just citizens.63
Equal with Respect to Fundamental Rights
For Lincoln, equality is not simply a matter of philosophical or a political principle – it is
a legal principle; as proof, Lincoln quoted the founders’ words from the Declaration:
They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral
developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in
what respects they did consider all men created equal – equal in “certain
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
This they said, and this meant.64
Charles L. Black has argued that that the Declaration of Independence is law.65 Whether
or not it is law in and of itself, it becomes law when the Supreme Court incorporates its
provisions into the Constitution, thus ensuring that “Our constitutional ideal of equal justice
under law is thus made a living truth.” 66
Equality as Equal Opportunity
Above all, Lincoln conceived of equality as “equal opportunity.” This self-made man
believed that every person has the right to achieve as much and to rise as far as his talent and
effort will take him. Lincoln expressed this idea in his address to the special session of Congress
on July 4, 1861, explaining to Congress and the American people why it was necessary to fight
for the principle of equality:

62

2 COLLECTED WORKS 499-500.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (stating, “It has long been settled, and it is not disputed
here, that the term "person" in this context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the
United States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they
reside.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (extending Equal Protection to “even aliens whose presence in
this country is unlawful.”).
64
2 COLLECTED WORKS 405.
65
See BLACK, note __ supra, at 8 (stating, “The Declaration as a whole was an act of ‘constitution,’ a juristic act, an
act of law, after the manner of law in all its fields, quite as surely as is a statute setting up a state police force.”).
66
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958).
63
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This is essentially a People's contest. On the side of the Union, it is a
struggle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance of government,
whose leading object is, to elevate the condition of men – to lift artificial weights
from all shoulders – to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all – to afford all, an
unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.67
Three years later he used the same expression – “the race of life” – in his remarks to
soldiers of the Ohio 166th Regiment on August 22, 1864, as he stood on the steps of the White
House:
I happen temporarily to occupy this big White House. I am a living
witness that any one of your children may look to come here as my father's child
has. It is in order that each of you may have through this free government which
we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise and
intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life, with all its
desirable human aspirations. It is for this the struggle should be maintained, that
we may not lose our birthright---not only for one, but for two or three years. The
nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel.68
For Lincoln, liberty and equality are not competing, but rather complementary values.
Only in “the wolf’s dictionary” does liberty negate equality.69 According to Lincoln, all persons
have an equal right to govern themselves and must be afforded equal opportunity to reach their
highest potential.
Equality Linked to the Principle of Self-Government
Lincoln’s faith in the principle that “all men are created equal” led him also to a profound
understanding of the principle of “self-government,” which he expressed in the Peoria address,
his first great response to Stephen Douglas. Douglas had developed a political solution to the
problem of the extension of slavery that he called “popular sovereignty.”70 It was the idea that
the people of each new state had the right to choose whether to enter the Union as a slave state or
a free state – that the people of each state could, by free elections, determine whether slavery
would be permitted or excluded from their territory.71 At Peoria Lincoln accepts the premise that
the principle of self government is right – “absolutely and eternally right”72 – a principle he calls

67

4 COLLECTED WORKS 439.
7 COLLECTED WORKS, at 512.
69
See notes __-__ supra and accompanying text.
70
See DONALD, note __ supra at 218 (setting forth Douglas’ position on popular sovereignty, and describing how
Lincoln forced Douglas to explicitly state his position).
71
See id.
72
2 COLLECTED WORKS 265.
68
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the “the sheet anchor of American republicanism”73 – but he challenges Douglas’ understanding
of the principle:
The doctrine of self government is right – absolutely and eternally right –
but it has no just application, as here attempted. Or perhaps I should rather say
that whether it has such just application depends upon whether a negro is not or is
a man. If he is not a man, why in that case, he who is a man may, as a matter of
self-government, do just as he pleases with him. But if the negro is a man, is it not
to that extent, a total destruction of self-government, to say that he too shall not
govern himself? When the white man governs himself that is self-government; but
when he governs himself, and also governs another man, that is more than selfgovernment---that is despotism. If the negro is a man, why then my ancient faith
teaches me that “all men are created equal;” and that there can be no moral right
in connection with one man's making a slave of another.74
Lincoln contends that the principle of self-government requires that all persons must have an
“equal voice in the government:”
Allow ALL the governed an equal voice in the government, and that, and that
only is self government.75
As we shall see, like Lincoln, the Supreme Court now believes that democracy is rooted
in principles of equality – that all citizens have an equal right to participate in the political
process.76 But it is in Lincoln’s general approach to interpreting the principles of the Declaration
that we find the greatest inspiration for constitutional law, and it is to that idea that we now turn.
Lincoln’s General Approach to Constitutional Interpretation
In our time Judge Robert Bork has written persuasively that, to the extent possible, the
Constitution must be interpreted according to “neutral principles” – that in interpreting the
Constitution judges should not make value choices, but instead should adhere to value choices
already made.77 The neutral principle that Bork identifies and would rely upon in interpreting
73

Id. at 266.
2 COLLECTED WORKS 265-266 (emphasis in original).
75
Id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
76
See notes __-__ infra and accompanying text.
77
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971)
(hereinafter Neutral Principles) (stating, “Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be
preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. The judge must stick close to
the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.”). See generally ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1997); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (2003); ROBERT H. BORK, A T IME TO SPEAK: SELECTED WRITINGS AND ARGUMENTS
(2008). But see Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1983) (criticizing the theory of neutral principles and the interpretive method of
specific intent).
74
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the Constitution is “original intent;” he insists that the Constitution should be interpreted the
same as the Framers would have interpreted it.78 Supporting Bork’s argument is the fact that
nearly all lawyers, judges, and legal scholars agree that the touchstone for statutory interpretation
is legislative intent;79 that the true meaning of a statute is the meaning that was intended by the
persons who wrote the statute.80 Because the Constitution is a law one could argue that it should
be interpreted the same way we interpret statutes, in a manner that is consistent with the meaning
that its drafters and adopters intended. Furthermore, one could argue, our fundamental political
principles require this approach. The people have the “original right” to establish a
government;81 because all just powers of government are derived from the “consent of the
governed,”82 the Constitution must be interpreted in accordance with the original intent of the
framers.
In a similar vein, Justice Antonin Scalia interprets the Constitution mainly by reference to
tradition. He has stated that “a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular,
identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.”83 Dissenting in Romer v. Evans,84 he defended a
state constitutional amendment that made it impossible to gays to gain the protection of
antidiscrimination laws on the ground that the people of the state were simply trying “to preserve
traditional sexual mores,”85 and he chastised the majority of the Court for “verbally disparaging
as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes.”86 In Lawrence v. Texas,87 another gay rights case
where Justice Scalia dissented, he stated that laws making same-sex sexual intercourse a crime
78

See Bork, Neutral Principles, note __ supra, at 13 (stating, “If the legislative history [of the Constitution]
revealed a consensus …, I do not see how the Court could escape the choices revealed and substitute its own, even
though the words are general and conditions have changed.”).
79
See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & AND ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 36 (1997) (setting forth a rough hierarchy of categories of legislative history for use in
statutory interpretation); but see Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989
DUKE L. J. 511, 517 (1989) (stating, “[t]o tell the truth, the quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a
wild-goose chase anyway.”).
80
See Bork, Neutral Principles at 11 (stating, “Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it
clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution.”).
81
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (stating, “That the people have an original right to establish, for
their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis,
on which the whole American fabric has been erected.).
82
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
83
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989) (Scalia, J.). But see id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
In her concurring opinion in the same case, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated:
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia’s opinion. This footnote sketches a mode of
historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions
in this area. On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights
at levels of generality that might not be “the most specific level” available. I would not foreclose
the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.
Id. at 132.
84
517 U.S. 620 (1966) (striking down a state constitutional amendment that prohibited the adopting of laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
85
Id. at 651 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87
593 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law making same-sex sexual intercourse a crime).

16

Draft 6 Page 17 of 32
February 13, 2010
are supported by “society’s belief that certain forms of sexual behavior are “immoral and
unacceptable,”88 and that the law in question was justified in light of the fact that the goal of the
statute was “preserving the traditional sexual mores of our society.”89 Finally, in his dissent in
United States v. Virginia90 – the case ordering the State of Virginia to admit women to the
Virginia Military Institute on an equal basis with men – Justice Scalia again makes “tradition”
the cornerstone of his opinion:
Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the
Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a
half. … [I]t counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present,
of men's military colleges supported by both States and the Federal
Government.91
Justice Scalia contends that V.M.I. became a target in that litigation because of its “attachment
to such old-fashioned concepts as manly ‘honor’ ….”92 Pursuant to Justice Scalia’s approach to
interpreting the Constitution, there are no fundamental rights to liberty and equality except those
that have been traditionally recognized by American society.93
The advantage of the interpretive methods employed by Judge Bork and Justice Scalia is
that the precise meaning of the Constitution can be determined by looking solely to the past – to
how the Constitution was understood by specific persons at specific points in time over the last
two centuries. The disadvantage of their interpretive approaches is, of course, the same.
Lincoln rejects sole reliance on “specific intent” or “specific tradition” as the proper
method to interpret the fundamental principles of liberty and equality. He does not believe that
the founders of this country or the drafters of the Constitution had realized the ultimate meaning
of either of these concepts. Nor does he believe that the people of his own time, who became the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, had achieved perfection in this regard.

88

Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
90
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering state to admit women to public military college).
91
Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93
See id. at 593 n. 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that laws regulating activities that are not “deeply rooted” in
tradition are not subjected to any standard of review greater than rational basis). Justice Scalia stated:
The Court is quite right that “’[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’” An asserted “fundamental liberty interest”
must not only be “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’ ” but it must also be “
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ ” so that “ ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it]
were sacrificed.’ ” Moreover, liberty interests unsupported by history and tradition, though not
deserving of “heightened scrutiny,” are still protected from state laws that are not rationally related
to any legitimate state interest.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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In his time, eminent legal authorities asserted the specific intent of the framers in support
of slavery. Chief Justice Roger Taney had made this point in Dred Scott,94 and Senator Stephen
Douglas had made the same argument in support of the extension of slavery.95 Neither Taney
nor Douglas believed that blacks were intended to be included in the phrase “all men are created
equal.”
On June 26, 1857, at Springfield, Lincoln repudiates their argument:
I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they
did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say
all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity.
They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all
men created equal -- equal in "certain inalienable rights, among which are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This they said, and this meant. They did
not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that
equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact
they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right,
so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.
They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar
to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even
though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of
life to all people of all colors everywhere.96
Lincoln does not embrace a static interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality.
He does not define these principles by reference to specific social and legal relations as they
existed at some point in our distant past. These principles are, instead, transcendent ideals that
94

See 60 U.S., at 407. Chief Justice Taney stated:
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the
Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as
slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a
part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable
instrument.

Id.
95

See 2 COLLECTED WORKS 406 (Lincoln quoting Douglas arguing that the framers did not mean to include blacks
in the phrase “all men are created equal.”). Douglas had stated:
`No man can vindicate the character, motives and conduct of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence except upon the hypothesis that they referred to the white race alone, and not to the
African, when they declared all men to have been created equal---that they were speaking of
British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in Great Britain--that they were entitled to the same inalienable rights, and among them were enumerated life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The Declaration was adopted for the purpose of justifying the
colonists in the eyes of the civilized world in withdrawing their allegiance from the British crown,
and dissolving their connection with the mother country.'
Id.
96
2 COLLECTED WORKS 405-406.
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obligate us to the “unfinished work,” the “great task remaining” of making our society more free
and more equal, so that all persons might have “an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race
of life.” Lincoln points us to the following goal: “in relation to the principle that all men are
created equal, let it be as nearly reached as we can.”97
Lincoln was not afraid of change. His single greatest achievement was to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation freeing the slaves in the South, but the single greatest political risk
that he took was to arm the black race – to make them soldiers.98 When a Confederate general
proposed taking the same step, another southern leader replied, “If slaves will make good
soldiers, then our whole theory of slavery is wrong.”99 In his message to Congress on December
1, 1862, preparing Congress and the country for emancipation and the arming of blacks, Lincoln
said:
“The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion
is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise -- with the occasion. As our case is
new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disentrall ourselves, and
then we shall save our country.”100
We now turn to an examination of how the Supreme Court has interpreted the
constitutional principles of liberty and equality in recent decades.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ADOPTION OF LINCOLN’S UNDERSTANDING OF
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
Since 1937 the Supreme Court has moved steadily closer to Lincoln’s understanding of
our basic rights to liberty and equality.
In 1938, in the case of United States v. Carolene Products,101 the Supreme Court signaled
that it was changing its emphasis from the protection of property rights to the protection of
human rights, and that henceforth laws affecting fundamental rights or the rights of minorities
would be subjected to “more exacting judicial scrutiny.”102 Over the intervening decades the
97

2 COLLECTED WORKS 501 (Speech at Chicago, July 19, 1858).
See 6 COLLECTED WORKS 28-30 (Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863); id. at 30 (stating, “And I further
declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the
United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.”).
99
SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR A NARRATIVE: FREDERICKSBURG TO MERIDIAN 955 (1963) (quoting Confederate
congressman and slaveholder Howell Cobb).
100
5 COLLECTED WORKS 537. See also 6 COLLECTED WORKS 409 (Letter to James Conkling, August 2, 1863)
(stating, “You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but, no matter.
Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union.”); id. 410 (stating that after the government achieved victory, “there
will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and wellpoised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while, I fear, there will be some white
ones, unable to forget that, with malignant heart, and deceitful speech, they have strove to hinder it.”).
101
304 U.S. 144 (1938) (applying rational basis test in upholding regulation of food product).
102
Id. at 153 n. 4. The Court stated:
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Roosevelt Court, the Warren Court, and subsequent courts continued to expand the
understanding of our fundamental rights to liberty and equality.
1. Liberty and the Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court
The word “liberty” has many applications: freedom from unlawful imprisonment,103 the
right of association,104 freedom of speech,105 and freedom of religion106 Justice Kennedy has
even drawn the connection between liberty and the doctrine of Separation of Powers.107 In this
portion of this article I focus upon a single application of the concept of liberty – the Right to
Privacy.
Like Lincoln’s political philosophy, the principle of the Right to Privacy is grounded in
the Declaration of Independence – in particular, the idea that all persons are endowed with the
inalienable right to “the pursuit of happiness.” And like Lincoln, the Supreme Court has come to
embrace a transcendent understanding of what that means.
The relation between the Declaration and the Right to Privacy was implicitly
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,108 the first Right to Privacy case. In
that case the Court struck down a state law which prohibited foreign language instruction in the
lower grades because the Court found that the right of parents to direct the education of their
children was “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,”109 and therefore implicit
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Id. (citation omitted).
103
See Boumediene v. Bush, __ U.S. __, __ (2008) (finding that prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to
habeas corpus hearings, and stating, “The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept
of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom.”).
104
See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (striking down order of state court
ordering civil rights organization to turn over membership list to court, stating, “In the domain of these
indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that
abridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental
action.”).
105
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating, “For present purposes we may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
106
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (finding a state statute, as applied, violated the defendants’
right to the Free Exercise of Religion, and stating, “The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the 14th]
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”).
107
See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down Line Item Veto Act); id. at 450 (Kennedy, J.)
(stating, “Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.”).
108
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state law forbidding the schools from teaching children a foreign language
before high school).
109
Id at 399. The Court stated:
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in the Constitution.110 Over the intervening decades the Court has expanded and refined the
concept of the Right to Privacy, ruling that prisoners have the right not to be sterilized,111 that
sexual partners have the right to use contraception,112 that interracial couples have the right to
marry,113 that women have the right to terminate their pregnancies prior to viability,114 that
people have the right to live with their extended families,115 and that patients have the right to
refuse medical treatment, even when the treatment is necessary to save the patient’s life.116 In its
most recent Right to Privacy case, Lawrence v. Texas,117 decided in 2003, the Supreme Court
ruled that individuals have a constitutional right to have sex with someone of the same gender.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence is significant because he defines the Right to
Privacy in transcendent terms, just as Abraham Lincoln viewed the principles of the Declaration.
Justice Kennedy commences his majority opinion in Lawrence with a discussion about the nature
of the Right to Privacy – whether the right primarily prohibits the government from interfering
with specific and concrete aspects of human behavior such as “sexual conduct in the home” or
whether it protects transcendent aspects of human nature such as “loving relationships.”
Kennedy opts for a broad reading of the Right to Privacy:
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and
more transcendent dimensions.118
According to Justice Kennedy, the problem with the Texas statute was that it seeks “to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is

While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
110
See id.
111
See Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law authorizing
sterilization of persons convicted of certain felonies).
112
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives,
as applied to married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending right to use contraception to
unmarried persons).
113
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state law prohibiting interracial marriage).
114
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state law prohibiting abortion except to save the life of the
woman).
115
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down municipal ordinance limiting the
power of extended family to share a “single-family” residence).
116
See Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding state law requiring that there must be clear and
convincing evidence of a patient’s wish to discontinue lifesaving medical treatment).
117
539 U.S. 538 (2003) (striking down state law making homosexual intercourse a crime).
118
Id. at 562.
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within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”119 Kennedy, adds:
When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to make this choice.120
In the key passage from his opinion, Justice Kennedy describes the scope and nature of
the Right to Privacy. In referring to prior cases affording constitutional protection to “personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education,”121 Justice Kennedy explains the meaning of these cases in universal terms:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.”122
In closing his opinion for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy made clear that the
framers intended for every generation of Americans to reassess “the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities:”
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume
to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom.123
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence is representative of Lincoln’s political philosophy
that calls us to a more enduring and transcendent understanding of freedom under the
Constitution.
2. The Supreme Court and the General Principle of Equality

119

Id. at 567.
Id.
121
Id. at 574
122
Id.
123
Id. at 578-579.
120
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A few years after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court issued a
number of rulings stating that the Equal Protection Clause had been adopted for the sole purpose
of protecting the newly freed slaves, and it expressed doubt that the clause would have
application to any other group.124 Invoking that reasoning, in 1873 the court denied relief to a
woman who had been barred by the State from entering the legal profession.125 Furthermore, for
many decades the Supreme Court neglected even to adequately protect the equal rights of blacks
and other racial minorities.126 By 1927 the Court could accurately characterize an Equal
Protection claim as “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”127
Over the last 70 years the Court’s interpretation and application of the Equal Protection
Clause has completely changed. Today, the Supreme Court has extended constitutional
protection to any and all groups of people.128 To achieve this goal the Court has adopted a
universal standard, applicable to all persons, for use in Equal Protection cases. As the Court said
in 1985 in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, Inc.:129

124

See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873), where the Court stated:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against
the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of
this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.
125
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (upholding decision of state supreme court barring women from
admission to the bar); id. at 7 (stating, “It is unnecessary to repeat the argument on which the judgment in
[Slaughter-House Cases] is founded. It is sufficient to say they are conclusive of the present case.
126
See, e.g., Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) (reversing the murder conviction of two whites who had
killed members of a black family on the ground that removal of this case to federal court was improper because, the
Court reasoned, the rights of the victim and the witness were not “affected” by the fact that blacks were not allowed
to testify in State courts); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (striking down civil rights law protecting
blacks right to vote); Cruikshank v. United States, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (reversing the convictions of the perpetrators
of the Colfax Massacre, on the ground that the indictment had simply stated that the victims were black, instead of
stating that the murders were committed because the victims were black); The Civil Rights Cases, 106 U.S. 3 (1883)
(striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a law prohibiting segregation in certain places of public
accommodation); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding Alabama statute forbidding blacks and whites
from marrying or from having sex with each other); Harris v. United States, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (declaring a civil
rights law, the Enforcement Act of 1871, to be unconstitutional, thus reversing the convictions of a lynch mob);
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.s. 678 (1887) (following Harris in finding the Ku Klux Klan Act to be unconstitutional
insofar as it applies to private action); Plessy v. Ferguson, 63 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring
segregated passenger cars on trains); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi election
laws designed to disenfranchise blacks); Cumming v. Richmond Bd. Of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to
intervene when the City of Richmond closed the high school for blacks but kept the school for whites open); Hodges
v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (overturning convictions of a group of individuals for interfering with the
civil rights of other individuals in violation of Civil Rights Act of 1866, in part because the statute could not be
grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “that the 14th and 15th Amendments do not justify the
legislation is also beyond dispute, for they, as repeatedly held, are restrictions upon state action, and no action on the
part of the state is complained of.”); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding racial segregation in the
public schools).
127
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (upholding the sterilization of institutionalized persons with mental
retardation).
128
See notes __-__ infra and accompanying text.
129
473 U.S. 432 (1985).

23

Draft 6 Page 24 of 32
February 13, 2010
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,” which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.130
The Court has used the same or similar wording in many cases.131 In Cleburne itself, the
Court ruled in favor of persons with mental disabilities who had been denied a zoning permit for
a group home;132 in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invoked that universal standard in striking
down a state law making homosexual sex a crime;133 and in Tennessee v. Lane the Court used the
same test in upholding the constitutionality of the application of the Americans with Disabilities
Act against a state that had failed to provide wheelchair access to a courthouse.134
In extending the scope of the Equal Protection Clause to include all groups, the Court has
not been mindful of tradition, as the following section of this article demonstrates.
3. Tradition is No Excuse for Inequality
In the notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson,135 the Supreme Court invoked custom and
tradition to justify a policy of official segregation,136 just as the Court in Dred Scott137 had
invoked the intent of the framers in denying citizenship to all African-Americans.138 Today, in
contrast, in Equal Protection cases the Supreme Court considers “tradition” to be a particularly
weak interpretive modality.
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,139 Justice William O. Douglas stated:
130

Id. at 439.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004) (quoting same language from Cleburne); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (same); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (stating that “all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike,” quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920);
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (recognizing an equal protection claim where the
plaintiff alleged she had been “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated”). This standard
apparently originates in the case of Barbier v. Connally, 113 U.S. 27 (1884) (legislation is constitutional if “it affects
alike all persons similarly situated”).
132
See Cleburne, 473 U.S., at 450 (stating, “The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to
rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded ….”).
133
See note __ supra and accompanying text.
134
See Lane, 541 U.S., at 533-534 (stating, “we conclude that Title II [of the ADA], as it applies to the class of
cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 authority
to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
135
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state law requiring railroad passenger cars to be racially segregated).
136
See id. at 550 (stating, “the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable
regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In
determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs,
and traditions of the people ….”).
137
60 U.S. 393 (1857) (striking down Missouri Compromise as violating the property rights of slaveholders and
holding that under the Constitution African-Americans could not become citizens).
138
See note __ supra and accompanying text.
139
383 U.S. 683 (1964) (striking down state poll tax on Equal Protection grounds).
131
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In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the
limits of fundamental rights. … Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.140
In upholding the equal the rights of gay and lesbians persons in cases such as Romer v.
Evans and Lawrence v. Texas,142 both of which were written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the
Court has quite obviously had to reject what Justice Scalia describes as “the traditional sexual
mores of our society.”143 In Romer Justice Kennedy instead invokes the “emerging tradition” of
statutory protection for disfavored groups,144 and in Lawrence Kennedy places principal reliance
upon the “emerging awareness” of protection accorded adult persons in matters pertaining to
sex.145 In his opinion for the Court in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy specifically states that
“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point”146 of
constitutional analysis, and that “we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here.”147
141

In her concurring opinion in Lawrence Justice O’Connor goes even further, concluding
that traditional notions of morality, by themselves, are “illegitimate” considerations. She states,
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by
itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is
not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without
any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under
the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be "drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."148
She also states, “the State cannot single out one identifiable class of citizens for
punishment that does not apply to everyone else, with moral disapproval as the only asserted
140

Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional amendment prohibiting the state legislature or political
subdivisions from adopting laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
142
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law making homosexual intercourse a crime).
143
See notes __ supra and accompanying text.
144
See Romer, 517 U.S., at 628.
145
See Lawrence, 539 U.S., at 572.
146
Id., quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 823, 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
147
Id. at 571-572.
148
Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
141
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state interest for the law,”149 and “A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based
on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs
contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of
review.”150
The illegitimacy of traditional notions of inequality is in fact a cornerstone of the modern
Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis. The Court has held that a key factor in determining
whether or not a group is a “suspect class” is whether or not the group has suffered a history of
discrimination.151 Another reason for the courts to be skeptical of a legal distinction is if it is
based upon “archaic and overbroad generalizations”152 or reflects “outmoded notions of the
relative capabilities” about different groups.153 History and tradition are, indeed, the starting
point for Equal Protection analysis. But under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause, traditional notions of inequality – including historical patterns of
discrimination, archaic stereotypes, and outmoded notions regarding human potential – are
presumed unconstitutional.
The rulings of the Supreme Court rejecting traditional beliefs and customary patterns of
discrimination are in accordance with Lincoln’s view that “we must disenthrall ourselves” and
“think anew” and “act anew” to save our country154 – that equality is a principle that must be
“constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained,
constantly approximated”155 – and that we must dedicate ourselves to the principle of equality so
that our country may have a “new birth of freedom.”156
4. Equality of Opportunity
After decades of upholding the constitutionality of segregated and unequal education for
blacks and other races,157 beginning in 1938 with the case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.

149

Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
151
See Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (stating, “The long and extensive
history of sex discrimination prompted us to hold that measures that differentiate on the basis of gender warrant
heightened scrutiny United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (stating, “our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
152
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 135 (stating, “this Court consistently has subjected gender-based
classifications to heightened scrutiny in recognition of the real danger that government policies that professedly are
based on reasonable considerations in fact may be reflective of ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations about
gender.” (citation omitted)).
153
See Cleburne, 473 U.S., at 441.
154
See note _ supra and accompanying text.
155
See note _ supra and accompanying text.
156
See note _ supra and accompanying text.
157
See Cumming v. Richmond Bd. Of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to intervene when the City of
Richmond closed the high school for blacks but kept the school for whites open); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78
(1927) (upholding racial segregation in the public schools).
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Canada,158 the Supreme Court began to tear down the walls of educational apartheid in
America.159 In its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,160 the Court emphasized
the value of public education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.161
As in other areas, the Supreme Court has expanded the concept of equal opportunity in
education to other groups. In Plyler v. Doe162 the Supreme Court extended the right to a free
public education to the children of undocumented aliens on the ground that law denying them
this right “poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of
individual merit.”163
Similarly, in United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that traditional notions of
gender roles do not justify the exclusion of women from a unique and prestigious state
university.164 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg stated that as full citizens, women must
158

305 U.S. 337 (1938) (ordering the State of Missouri to admit an African-American student to its state law
school).
159
See Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, note __ supra, at 54-56 (describing the role of the Roosevelt Court
in ending public school segregation); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 277 (stating,
“Foremost in the Warren Court’s catalogue of individual rights was that to racial equality.”).
160
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlawing official racial segregation in the public schools). See also SCHWARTZ, note __
supra, at 277 (stating, “Brown not only outlawed school segregation but also served as the foundation for a series of
decisions outlawing racial segregation in all public institutions.”).
161
Brown, 347 U.S., at 493.
162
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
163
Id. at 221-222. The Court stated:
The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and
every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual,
and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual
achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of
basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 222 (footnote omitted).
164
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering state to admit women on the same basis as men to a public military college); see
id. at 557-558. The Court stated:
A prime part of the history of our Constitution, historian Richard Morris recounted, is the story of
the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded. VMI's
story continued as our comprehension of “We the People” expanded. There is no reason to
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have “equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their
individual talents and capacities.”165
The Supreme Court has ruled that any deviations from a color-blind governmental policy
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.166 In 2003 in the case of Grutter v.
Bollinger,167 upholding the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of Michigan
Law School, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. … Access to legal education
(and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous
society may participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America.168
Opening the path of leadership to persons of every race and ethnicity is, according to
Grutter, a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify a deviation from color-blind
governmental action.
5. Equal Right to Participation in the Political Process
Since 1937 the Supreme Court has knocked down a number of laws and policies that
were intended to deprive African-Americans of an equal right to participate in the political
process.169 But, as in other areas of equal protection, the Court has extended this concept of
political equality to all groups.
In Harper v. Board of Elections170 the Court struck down the poll tax as applied in state
elections, thus opening up the political process to the poor. The Court ruled that with respect to

believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets would
destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the “more perfect Union.”
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
165
Id. at 532. The Court stated:
Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts
compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women,
simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve,
participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.
166
See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (plurality opinion) (stating, “all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.”).
167
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action admissions program at public law school).
168
Id. at 332-333 (citation omitted).
169
See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (striking down at-large voting system designed to prevent the
election of African-American candidates).
170
383 U.S. 663 (1964) (striking down state poll tax).
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the right to vote, it makes no difference “whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, has
$1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all.”171
In Reynolds v. Sims,172 the Court declared malapportionment to be unconstitutional. In
the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that the Equal Protection Clause
requires “the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental
action questioned or challenged”173 because “all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same
relation regardless of where they live.”174 Warren concluded:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight
of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon
factors such as race, or economic status. Our constitutional system amply
provides for the protection of minorities by means other than giving them
majority control of state legislatures. And the democratic ideals of equality and
majority rule, which have served this Nation so well in the past, are hardly of any
less significance for the present and the future.175
In Romer v. Evans176 the Supreme Court struck down yet another device that the States
have utilized, again and again, to deprive unpopular groups of equal political rights. In Romer
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Colorado state constitutional amendment that
prohibited the legislature, political subdivisions, or any state agency from adopting laws or
policies protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.177 The effect of this
law was to make it impossible for gays and lesbians, acting through the normal political process,
to gain the protection of the government on the same basis as other people could be protected
against discrimination based upon race, gender, age, disability, or a host of other
characteristics.178
The Supreme Court had previously addressed this issue with regard to race. In a series
of cases the Court struck down state constitutional amendments and a city charter amendment
that purported to withdraw from normal political bodies the power to adopt civil rights measures
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such as fair housing laws or voluntary school integration programs.179 Lincoln had condemned a
similar practice with regard to slavery in his speech of June 26, 1857, where he noted that
although the framers had generally favored the abolition of slavery, more recently the states had
adopted constitutional amendments that prohibited their legislatures from even considering
emancipation or manumission: “In those days, Legislatures held the unquestioned power to
abolish slavery in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for State
Constitutions to withhold that power from the Legislatures.”180 Lincoln compared these state
constitutional amendments to a “prison house:”
They have him in his prison house; they have searched his person, and left no
prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the heavy iron
doors upon him, and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a
hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key;
the keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred
different and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the
dominions of mind and matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his
escape more complete than it is.181
In Romer, Justice Kennedy explained why state constitutional amendments like these
violate Equal Protection, no matter what group of citizens are affected:
A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens
than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
protection of the laws in the most literal sense.182
Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that all citizens must have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
This principle was articulated most eloquently in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion in
Reynolds, where he explains how the Court should apply a transcendent principle such as
equality to changing conditions. In support of this approach to constitutional interpretation,
Warren expressly invokes Lincoln’s vision of democracy:
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To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a
citizen. … A nation once primarily rural in character becomes predominantly
urban. Representation schemes once fair and equitable become archaic and
outdated. But the basic principle of representative government remains, and must
remain, unchanged – the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on
where he lives. Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration
and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment
controversies. A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he
lives in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. This is an essential part of the concept of
a government of laws and not men. This is at the heart of Lincoln's vision of
‘government of the people, by the people, (and) for the people.’ The Equal
Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative
representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races.183
Lincoln’s speeches and letters have inspired the Supreme Court, as they have inspired all
Americans, to a deeper understanding of the principles of liberty and equality.
CONCLUSION
The concept of “equality” is no longer measured by traditional attitudes and social
customs, but rather by reference to people’s actual abilities. People must be given an equal
opportunity to succeed and participate in the political life of the country. Traditional notions of
capability, morality, or social role are illegitimate reasons for the government to treat any group
of persons differently. Because “all men are created equal,” our courts now require that “all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”184
Similarly, “liberty” is no longer determined simply by reference to tradition, but rather by
taking into account the transcendental importance of an activity in the life of the individual as
well as the capacity for the activity to cause harm. In this sense, the courts now recognize that
individuals have a constitutional right to make “personal and intimate choices”185 in their private
lives and living arrangements.
These ideas have become central to American life and law because of a man who came
from “poverty and obscurity,”186 but who, like millions of other Americans before and since,
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wanted desperately to rise,187 and who fought to give all persons “an unfettered start and a fair
chance in the race for life.”188
Lincoln did not address his speeches, letters, and remarks to the Supreme Court. He
addressed us in order to convince us to adopt a broader and more universal understanding of the
Declaration and the Constitution. Nor is he the only American leader to call upon the better
angels of our nature.
In 1944 an Atlanta high school junior entered an oratorical contest on the subject “The
Negro and the Constitution.” The youth closed his speech with the following words:
The spirit of Lincoln still lives. … America experiences a new birth of freedom
in her sons and daughters; she incarnates the spirit of her martyred chief. Their
loyalty is repledged; their devotion renewed to the work He left unfinished. My
heart throbs anew in the hope that inspired by the example of Lincoln, imbued
with the spirit of Christ, they will cast down the last barrier to perfect freedom.189
Martin Luther King, Jr., won that contest190 and he later led this Nation in the unfinished work
for which both he and Lincoln gave the last full measure of devotion.
Time and again, Lincoln’s acts and words have reawakened America’s commitment to
human rights. His call for us to dedicate ourselves to the transcendent principles of liberty and
equality resonates down to the present day.
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